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State of Maine
Office of the Public Advocate

A Ratepayer Focused Strategy for
Distributed Solar in Maine
1. Introduction
This white paper offers a framework for sustainable growth in Maine’s distributed solar energy sector
that maximizes and fairly allocates benefits for all ratepayers. This approach builds on the Public Utilities
Commission’s recent “value of solar” study as well as lessons learned from other states. The policy
proposed is specifically tailored to the state of Maine and offers innovative program design features
intended to capitalize on the latest technological advances in the solar industry. The goals guiding this
policy are the following:








Maximization of ratepayer benefits: Establish competitive market structures that take
advantage of advances in technology and declining costs to the benefit of all ratepayers.
Transparent allocation of costs and benefits: Clearly link actual system benefits to
transparent compensation mechanisms.
Opportunity for participation across all solar market segments: Allow every market
segment the opportunity to participate in the program on fair terms, from retail
customer-paired residential solar, commercial and industrial resources, to standalone
distribution-connected wholesale resources.
Market-based encouragement of technological innovation: Allow data-based value
adders to encourage technologies, combinations of technologies, and resource dispatch
behaviors that are beneficial to the grid.
A fair balancing of stakeholder interests: Each key stakeholder group receives equal
consideration with a focus on win-win approaches (e.g. no one group left as a clear loser
or winner).

While designed to present a coherent and holistic policy framework for state-wide adoption, this
whitepaper is also intended to solicit stakeholder feedback.
1.1 High-level Policy Overview
This framework uses market forces to maximize value to all ratepayers, while fairly compensating solar
adopters. The core attributes of the policy are as follows:
1. A cost-conscious alternative option to the current net metering based system.
2. Long-term compensation structures with a levelized cost of energy cap set initially at a level
based on a value of solar analysis and above the current level of compensation offered by net
metering.
3. Competitive bidding and capacity based step downs to drive actual program costs well below
this initial level.
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4. The potential (if the market can reach aggressive pricing targets) for 300 MWs of total new solar
capacity by 2025, divided between three market segments – wholesale (150 MW),
residential/commercial (100 MW), and industrial/community (50 MW).
5. Aggregation and procurement of solar resources to capture and monetize the value of solar
generation in the relevant markets.
This whitepaper is divided into four sections, including this introduction (Section1). Section 2 provides
an overview of Maine’s existing net metering policy, its advantages and its shortcomings. Section 3
describes the results of the Maine Public Utilities Commission’s value of solar study. Section 4 describes
an alternative solar policy, rooted in the Commission’s value of solar analysis and the goals described
above. The Appendix include lessons learned in three states, California, Arizona, and Minnesota that
informed the policy approach set forth here.

2. Overview of Net Energy Policy in Maine
Net metering, or net energy billing (NEM), is a billing mechanism that allows customers to receive credit
for energy produced on-site that is sent back to the grid at the variable retail electricity rate. In Maine,
this is currently the primary incentive available for distributed solar generation. Maine’s two investorowned utilities (IOUs) must offer net energy billing to their customers.
Net metering is popular with both customers and the solar industry. The primary benefit of net
metering is its simplicity: to rate payers, developers, investors, and regulators.
However, the falling costs of solar, paired with rising retail electricity costs have driven increased
adoption that has revealed revealing certain issues with the net metering platform. While it is not an
issue yet in Maine, the scalability of NEM is under review in a number of states. At high penetrations of
solar, the retail rates underpinning NEM may not send timely or appropriate price signals to solar
adopters—in short, these customers might be compensated at rates that either do not reflect the value
of the resource or the continuing decline in the installed cost of solar. While this may result in higher
levels of solar installation, at increased penetration rates these issues may undermine the scalability of
the policy.
Other issues inherent in the net metering incentive structure include:






There is no certainty for net metering customers, whose rates may change in response to
variations in wholesale prices and rate design. This lack of certainty can raise consumer
protection concerns and may also impact the costs of financing.
The economics of the underlying rate design may not make sense for larger commercial and
industrial customers because their costs are largely recovered through demand charges.
High rates of rapid adoption can lead to significant cost shifts to non-net metered customers. In
other words, as net metered customers invest in self generation and reduce their electricity
bills, non-net metered customers might pick up a greater share of the overall costs to deliver
energy.
There is little transparency regarding the relative costs/benefits and cost shifts.
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Discussion of rate design changes affecting all customers may be disproportionately impacted by
a small, subset of solar customers and supporters.

For many of the reasons stated above, some states are revisiting traditional net metering or, at least, the
underlying rate designs upon which it rests. In Maine, a Commission imposed check-in point of NEM
occurs when 1% of peak system load is reached by NEM based systems. This target is on the verge of
being reached for Central Maine Power in 2015.

3. The Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study
Pursuant to the “Act to Support Solar Energy Development in Maine” (P.L Chapter 562; codified at 35‐A
M.R.S. §§ 3471‐3473) (“Act”), the Maine Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) was required to
develop a methodology for determining the value of distributed solar energy generation in the State. In
March of 2015, after robust stakeholder input on all aspects of the methodology, the Commission
published the “Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study.” The Study contained three major findings: (1) a
methodology for estimating the cost and benefits of solar, (2) values for each cost and benefit
(expressed as dollars per kilowatt hour) for the three utility territories, and (3) implementation options
for encouraging solar adoption within the State’s existing utility framework.
2.2 Methodology for Quantifying Costs and Benefits of Solar PV
The Public Utilities Commission and their consultants, with direction from the Legislature, identified ten
categories of benefits and costs that provide a reasonable estimate of what distributed solar energy can
provide to the state of Maine. Given the broad variation in output and location of solar facilities and the
complexities of Maine’s competitive market structure, the study made a number of sensible simplifying
assumptions. One of the benefits of the policy proposal outlined below is the opportunity to refine these
values based on changes in the relevant markets and data based on actual output of solar facilities in
Maine. Figure 1 below highlights the elements considered in the cost/benefit calculation performed in
the Commission’s study.
Figure 1. Identified Cost and Benefits from Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study
Component

Benefit/Cost Basis

Avoided Energy Cost

Hourly avoided wholesale market procurements, based on ISO
New England day ahead locational marginal prices for the Maine
Load Zone.

Avoided Generation
Capacity and Reserve
Capacity Costs

ISO New England Forward Capacity Market (FCM) auction clearing
prices, followed by forecasted capacity prices by the ISO’s
consultant. For reserves, the ISO’s reserve planning margin is
applied.

Avoided Natural Gas
Pipeline Costs

Not included, but left as a future placeholder if the cost of building
future pipeline capacity is built into electricity prices.
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Component

Benefit/Cost Basis

Solar Integration Costs

Operating reserves required to handle fluctuations in solar output,
based on the New England Wind Integration Study (NEWIS)
results.

Avoided Transmission
Capacity Cost

ISO New England Regional Network Service (RNS) cost reductions
caused by coincident solar peak load reduction.

Avoided Distribution
Capacity Cost

Not included, but left as a future placeholder if the peak
distribution loads begin to grow (requiring new capacity).

Voltage Regulation

Not included, but left as a future placeholder if new
interconnections standards come into existence allowing inverters
to control voltage and provide voltage ride‐through to support the
grid.

Net Social Cost of Carbon,
SO2, and NOx

EPA estimates of social costs, reduced by compliance costs
embedded in wholesale electricity prices.

Market Price Response

The temporary reduction in electricity and capacity prices
resulting from reduced demand, based on the Avoided Energy
Supply Costs in New England (AESC) study.

Avoided Fuel Price
Uncertainty

The cost to eliminate long term price uncertainty in natural gas
fuel displaced by solar.

Source: Adapted from Table ES-1. Benefit/Cost Bases from Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study.
Pg. 3. http://www.nrcm.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/MPUCValueofSolarReport.pdf
Specific monetary values for providing the benefits listed above were aggregated to each of the three
utility service territories (i.e., Central Maine Power – CMP; Bangor Hydro District - BHD, and Maine
Public District - MPD). As shown in Figure 2 below, the 25-year levelized cost 1 of distributed solar in
CMP’s service territory was approximately $0.337/kWh. This estimate is broadly broken out by
“Avoided Market Costs” and “Societal Benefits,” valued at $0.138/kWh and $0.199/kWh respectively.
0F

1

Levelized cost represents the average total cost to build and operate the power-generating asset over its lifetime
divided by the total power output of the asset over that lifetime. It is a metric often used to compare the price
competitiveness of different generating technologies.
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Figure 2. CMP Distributed Value – 25 Year Levelized ($ per kWh)

Source: Norris, Benjamin; Grace, Robert; Perez, Dr. Richard; Rabago, Karl. Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study. Prepared for the Maine Public
Utilities Commission. Revised April 14, 2015. Pg. 50.
http://www.nrcm.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/MPUCValueofSolarReport.pdf
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2.3 Avoided Market Costs and Societal Costs
The costs and benefits identified by the Commission fall into two primary categories: avoided market
costs, and societal costs.
Avoided Market Costs
Avoided Market Costs are values that most directly affect electricity customer bills. These include the
costs and benefits related to capital expenditures and operating expenses normally recouped by the
utility in a customer’s electricity bill. Distributed solar can offer ratepayer benefits by allowing for
avoided costs including avoided energy purchases, avoided capacity purchases and avoided
transmission upgrades. The system-wide reduction in electricity and capacity prices due to an overall
reduction in energy demand (stemming from distributed solar generation) is a direct benefit as well;
however, it applies to all ratepayers and is not directly monetizable. From a cost perspective, having
more intermittent generation can lead to additional outlays associated with integration and voltage
regulation.
Societal Costs
Societal benefits include environmental benefits in the form of avoided air pollution (CO2, NOx, SO2) and
avoidance of long-term fuel price uncertainty. These values are typically not included in the utility’s
ratemaking process or the supply portion of a customer’s bill.
Relevant and Direct Values to Ratepayers
Projecting market-based costs and benefits out many years is not without some uncertainty but
quantifying societal considerations presents a more challenging undertaking. To be clear, these benefits
do exist and can be meaningful; however, the ultimate value may be harder to quantify, much less
allocate. Establishing a compensation rate that is initially above direct market cost is one way of
recognizing the environmental benefits of solar while not using ratepayer dollars to pay directly for nonmarket values that may be difficult to quantify. Alternatively if the cost-benefit analysis is clearly
justified based upon the avoided market costs, and sufficiently compensates solar generators, the goal
of maximizing ratepayer benefits can be achieved without paying directly for societal benefits.

4. A New Program Design
The policy presented here is based on the premise that there are now better ways than net metering to
encourage solar adoption that send the right signals to developers and consumers, drive technological
innovation, and allow utilities to more easily manage the increase in intermittent generation. This paper
presents policy concepts for two important distributed solar market segments in Maine:



Customer-sited (systems installed for residential and small commercial/industrial
customers)
Wholesale (systems installed on the utility side of the meter within the distribution
system)

An aggregation entity, or “Solar Standard Buyer” (SSB) would interface with the customer sited market
segment. Under the existing net metering construct, this role is currently assumed by the Standard Offer
Provider or a customer’s competitive electricity provider. Centralizing procurement with the SSB would
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allow for a more efficient aggregation and sale of the different attributes solar energy can provide. The
SSB would aggregate the energy, RECs, capacity value, and ancillary services potential and monetize
these in the applicable markets. As stated previously, the underlying goal of the policy structure is to
allow Maine ratepayers to capture the benefits of distributed solar energy while minimizing the costs
and inequities experienced in other states.
For the wholesale market, the Commission would solicit competitive bids with the ultimate purchaser
for these contracts being the Standard Solar Buyer. The amounts purchased would “prime the pump”
for the Standard Solar Buyer’s solar portfolio to ensure that the portfolio is of sufficient scale to
efficiently monetize the benefits described above.
These policies combine the values of distributed solar calculated in the Commission’s Study with the
lessons and experience from other states. The idea is to set Maine on a course that allows the
distributed solar market to grow and thrive and for incentives to align with market maturity. If
successful, this policy could provide a platform for future innovation and development for all types
distributed resources. Below is a more detailed discussion of each program and market specifics.
4.1 Customer-sited Solar Contract
For the customer-sited market segment, the compensation structure must be straight forward for the
customer and subject to reasonable financing. 2 The core of the policy is the Customer-sited Solar
Contract (“CSC”), a fixed-price, 20-year contract between the customer and the solar aggregator.
Twenty years is a common term for solar equipment financing and well within adopter payback. The
compensation rate for all market segments would be capped initially at the sum of the direct market
derived values found in the Distributed Solar Valuation Study (see below). While societal values will not
be compensated directly (for reasons stated above), if the solar industry thrives below the value cap
then all Maine residents reap the financial and environmental benefits of solar. The following is the
value stack associated with a 20-year levelized assessment: 3
1F

2F

2

Experience in other states shows that the ability to obtain reasonable financing for customer-sited solar is
essential to ensuring access to customers across a range of income levels.
3
Several potential market-based values were not included in the value stack presented by the Commission
valuation study. These include avoided natural gas pipeline cost, avoided distribution capacity cost, and ancillary
service benefits. These values can either be hard to quantity, de minimis, and/or highly locational. The CSC
structure should not neglect solar’s possible value in these areas and when appropriate, the compensation rate
should reflect locational specific benefits. Nevertheless, the quantification of these benefits for compensation will
have to be based on further study and market data from actual deployment or established on a project/location
specific basis.
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Figure 3. Levelized Value Stack (20 years) for Customer-sited
Solar Contract - CMP

Value Component

CMP 20 Year LCOE
($/kWh)

Avoided Energy Cost

$0.078

Avoided Generation Capacity
Cost

$0.039

Avoided Residential Generation
Capacity Cost

$0.005

Solar Integration Cost

-$0.004

Avoided Trans. Capacity Cost

$0.016

Market Price Response

$0.069

Total

$0.20

Under the CSC, a solar aggregator would enter in a long-term, fixed contract with residential and small
business customers that choose to host solar energy. The “payment” would be based on a per kWh rate
that would appear as a monthly bill credit on the customer’s bill (similar to Maine’s existing NEM
structure). The level of compensation would be capped at $0.20/kWh.
As stated above, centralizing procurement with the Solar Standard Buyer would allow for a more
efficient aggregation and selling of the different attributes solar energy can provide. The role of the solar
aggregator is also central to this policy framework. The solar aggregator, which could be a distribution
utility or a Commission-designated third party, will be the counterparty for each CSC, and will be
responsible for aggregating and monetizing the value of the different attributes Maine’s solar
generation fleet provides.
Both the payments to customers under a CSC and the revenues received through this aggregation and
sale would be credited to all customers through T&D utilities’ existing stranded cost mechanisms. The
near-term premium, the difference between the amount recovered by the solar aggregator and the
amount paid under a CSC, would be covered in the stranded cost adjustor on each customer’s bill.
Likewise, this would be the same account that would be credited when wholesale prices increase above
the solar contract.
While the near-term compensation level for a CSC is higher than current retail and wholesale rates, nonparticipating customers will be better off than under net metering, because they will capture, monetize
and retain substantially more of the benefits associated with distributed solar generation. Nonparticipating customers may even realize benefits over time if the revenue received from monetizing the
benefits described above overtakes the fixed price of the solar contract. Because the first year level of
compensation is capped based on the avoided market costs calculated in the Commission’s value of
solar, customers will not pay more than the best available estimate of the likely benefits to them, even if
all of these benefits are not directly monetized by the Solar Buyer.
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4.2 Market Based Step Downs
Common practice for large scale resource procurement is bilateral competitive bidding. For small PV
systems on rooftops this is administratively burdensome and impractical for a variety of reasons.
Nonetheless, there must be some mechanism to deliver ratepayer benefit as the solar industry scales
and the technology matures. The appendix of this whitepaper contains two case studies of states that
successfully implemented a capacity-based step down. This policy adopts that approach.
For residential and commercial customers, a declining trigger mechanism based on installed capacity
would be established to automatically decrease the level of compensation for new customers entering
into CSCs (not existing CSC customers). The capacity-based step down approach would reduce the CSC
contract price by $0.01/kWh at each step until the incentive reaches wholesale electricity rates. As
shown in Figures 4 and 5, the number of MWs available at each step increases with each consecutive
step.
Figure 4. Incentive levels for a Capacity-based step down Approach

Step

MW in Step

Cumulative
Installed Capacity

Step-specific Incentive
Level (¢/kWh)

1

5

5

20

2

6

12

19

3

7

19

18

4

8

27

17

5

9

36

16

6

10

46

15

7

11

57

14

8

12

69

13

9

14

83

12

10

17

100

11 (or fixed wholesale rate)

The design of the program attempts to glide the industry to scale in a cost effective manner to 2025. The
average compensation decline rate through the various steps is approximately 6.5%. This was designed
to correlate to the average declines in solar energy system costs over the past 15 years. 4 The declines
also more than cover the diminishing returns associated with increase solar penetration.
3F

It is important to note that the rates above are for standard PV systems without locational adders or
additional benefits that can be realized when combining PV with other technologies like controllable
water heaters, energy storage, or with demand response programs. The Commission could create future
4

Reported system prices of residential and commercial PV systems declined 6%–7% per year, on average, from
1998– 2013, and by 12%–15% from 2012–2013, depending on system size. Photovoltaic System Pricing Trends,
2014 Edition, US DOE SunShot: http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/62558.pdf
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set asides with higher compensation depending on market condition, capacity value, and other state
objectives.
A 50 MW carve-out would be created for large commercial and industrial customers as well as
community-based solar installations. The Commission would conduct a quarterly reverse auction for a
specified level of installed capacity, where only the lowest project bids would be accepted. As with
residential CSCs, the output of the facilities would be purchased by the solar aggregator. The cap of the
compensation would be equivalent to the corresponding cap of the residential program at that time,
though we anticipate that these bids would be considerably lower. This would allow large commercial
and industrial customers, and residential customers without access to suitable locations on their own
property, to participate in the distributed solar market, while using market-based mechanisms that
capture the economies of scale associated with larger installations to drive down costs to all ratepayers.
Once the capacity-based step down mechanism is in place, on an annual basis, the Commission can
revisit and adjust value of solar (VOS) levels according to changes in the energy market (e.g., spikes in
natural gas prices) or include adders to stimulate more adoption. Any potential changes in the VOS
would not affect customers with existing long-term contracts. As such, there will be minimal impacts to
the ability to finance projects. In the event that the Commission decreases the VOS below an existing
step, the revised value will remain unchanged until a subsequent step is triggered with a lower value. If
the Commission increases the VOS, it will need to stipulate how it declines by step.
Figure 5. Overview of Step-level Changes
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4.3 Wholesale Distributed Generation Program
While the value of solar study informs a maximum cap of $0.20/kWh, the lower the compensation rate
paid to solar generation facilities under this “value of solar” cap, the greater the benefits to Maine’s
non-participating ratepayers. Fortunately, the economies of scale that solar energy possesses can bring
the price per kWh down quickly. Therefore, utility side of the meter wholesale solar within the
distribution system may bring all the benefits of customer sited solar energy but at much lower cost. The
output of these larger facilities would also serve to provide a critical mass of solar output to make
aggregation and sale of the output from residential solar by the Solar Buyer more cost-effective.
Similar to the arrangement described above in Figure 5, developers of these 1-5 MW scale installations
would be compensated at a fixed rate. Bi-annual competitive procurement by the transmission and
distribution utilities would attempt to find the lowest priced but most impactful projects. The
mechanism would be similar to that currently used by the Commission under 35-A M.R.S. § 3210-C to
purchase energy and capacity from grid scale renewables.

4.4 Program Size
The program size for Maine was determined by studying California’s CSI program (see Appendix) and
Arizona’s distributed generation set asides as a proxy. When California’s CSI program started in 2007,
the goal was to install approximately 1,940 MW of new solar generation for homes and small
businesses. At the time, this represented about 3% of their total installed capacity. 5 Arizona’s RPS based
program set a DG solar target of 4.5% of load by 2025. 6 Maine’s current generation capacity is
approximately 4,500 MW. 7 In 2014, Maine’s retail electricity load for its investor-owned T&D utilities
was approximately 10,500 GWh. A 2025 DG target of 3.3% is between CA and AZ’s target (trending
more towards California) and would result in approximately 150 MW of new solar capacity. This would
be complimented by 150 MWs for wholesale programs over five years. This establishes a total potential
program size of 300 MW if the market succeeds on compensation rates closer to wholesale. By
comparison, recent legislative proposals in Maine advanced by solar advocates targeted 200 MW of new
solar installations by 2021.
4F

5F

6F

A total of nearly 5% of load served by customer sited and wholesale solar resources is reasonable given
the maturing state of the solar technology, especially if the program envisioned fully utilizes advanced
inverters, optimal locations, and coupling with other technologies. Moreover, if the full 300 MW is
deployed, a large portion of those MWs will be compensated at or near the future wholesale rate of
energy. If this occurs, it would present a significant amount of benefits to ratepayers for years to come.
A sensitivity analysis conducted in the Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study for exactly 300 MW of
distributed solar shows solar retains value even at higher penetrations.

5

California Energy Commission. Installed in-state Electric Generation Capacity by Fuel Type (MW). Energy Almanac.
http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/electricity/electric_generation_capacity.html
6
2006, the Commission approved the Renewable Energy Standard and Tariff
http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/utilities/electric/res.pdf?d=97
7
U.S. Energy Information Administration. Maine Electricity Profile, 2012.
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/maine/
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Figure 7. 300 MW Sensitivity (CMP) 8
7F

4.5 Additional Program Features
Very few resources are able to be deployed in a modular fashion within the distribution system and on
customer premises. Clearly, the various attributes of solar energy bring challenges and opportunities.
However, correctly structured programs can balance the tradeoffs. Significant flexibility could be in built
into both programs to allow for such things as locational adders, advanced inverters, renewable energy
credit transfer, and differentiated rates based upon on-peak performance. The following list includes
some additional features of the proposed solar programs:
Renewable Energy Credit (“REC”) Transfer – With a portion of Maine’s renewable resources able to
deliver to other states and the unknown impact of the EPA Clean Power Plan, RECs can be valuable to
the state. As such, program participants would be required to assign their RECs over to the distribution
utility.
Advanced Inverters – New inverters have the capability to provide grid services and remotely update
new software parameters to meet future needs. Program participants would be required to obtain
advanced inverters. Further, if in the future the distribution utility seeks to control certain inverter
functions remotely, they could do so as long as the impact on system production was less than 5%. The
potential of having an aggregated fleet of distributed resources could yield many benefits to Maine’s
ratepayers.

8

Norris, Benjamin; Grace, Robert; Perez, Dr. Richard; Rabago, Karl. Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study.
Prepared for the Maine Public Utilities Commission
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Role for Other Technologies - This VOS program puts in place the infrastructure for other resources like
combined heat and power (CHP), energy storage, and small-scale hydro to take advantage of once their
respective benefits are studied. The general framework of market competition and long-term contracts
can easily be swapped to different technologies. More importantly, the greater the diversity of
resources, the better it is from a grid balancing perspective. The unique attributes of the different
technologies available today bring system wide diversity and resiliency to the system.
Obligation of the Solar Standard Buyer and Distribution Utility – The Solar Standard Buyer plays a key
role in these programs. It must actively seek ways to maximize the value of the solar resource and
facilitate market adoption within the confines of the program. Likewise, distribution utilities have a
responsibility to drive down the soft costs of distributed energy resources through streamlined
interconnection and constructive participation in procurement programs. Subject to reasonable
limitations, there could be a role for utility participation in the wholesale distributed generation
program.
Yearly Program Revision – The Commission must have a yearly update and review process to ensure
correct compensation and offer new ones to maximize solar’s value. This can include price signals to
encourage different production profiles, dispatchablity by encouraging pairing with onsite storage, or
location-specific targeting. Again, new rates would only impact new subscribers. The market based step
downs should alleviate any concern of over compensation, but a regular review may be needed,
particularly in response to new occurrences in the market (e.g. gas prices volatility and new regulations).
Switching for Existing NEM Customers – Those customers that want to switch to the CSC program can
do so as long as they separately meter their installation, assign over their RECs, and commit to installing
an advanced inverter when replacement of their current inverter is needed. These customers would
have no impact on the total program cap or step downs but a limited window would exist for switching.
Those NEM customers who choose not to switch would continue in that program.
Tax Implications – The non-wholesale PV systems under this program would still be on the customer
side of the meter and the kWh based compensation would not be a legal sale of energy. It would be a
non-taxable bill credit. As under the current program, any excess credits at year end would be forfeited
to the distribution utility.
Federal Policy Considerations – If the 30% Federal Investment Tax Credit sunsets, the current rate of
CSC compensation for new sign-ups increases proportionally to make up for the loss as long as
compensation rate is still below the $20 cent/kWh cap. The same treatment applies to any new tax
implications that may arise for the proposed compensation structure.
End of Term Conditions – For all market segments, after the term of the contract is completed, the solar
host would be paid at a different rate based on either a wholesale derivative or the then current value
of solar rate.

4.6 Comparison to NEM
Figure 6 highlights the existing retail rates in Maine. The capacity-based step down approach would
compensate the customer at rates that initially exceed retail rates. Not until Step 8 or 9 does the
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estimated payment match current retail rates. A customer’s preference at that point depends on future
rates and rate design as well as risk tolerance. The CSC provides a fixed predictable rate with adders to
encourage technology coupling. Net metering under a traditional rate design does not offer those
features even if it is initially at a higher rate than the CSC.

Figure 6. Standard Offer Rates for Maine IOUs

Investor-owned Utility
CMP
Emera - Bangor Hydro Division
Emera - Maine Public Division
Average

(All values in expressed as ¢/kWh)
Delivery
Residential /Small
Total*
Rates
Commercial
4.19
6.63
6.31

6.45
6.64
8.49
7.19

10.73
13.13
14.80
12.89

Source: http://maine.gov/mpuc/electricity/standard_offer_rates/index.html
*The average retail rate for Medium Non-residential customers is approximately the same as
residential (12.90 ¢) through the end of 2015.

Figure 7. Highlights the differences between the existing net metering framework and proposed
program design
Existing NEM Structure

New CSC Program Design

Non transparent payment that can be
either above or below the true market
cost

Fully transparent compensation rate with
customers being paid for the actual values
they provide to the grid

More difficult for utility to manage grid
as intermittent generation increases

Smart inverters are required.

Lack of easily updateable price signals

Transparent setting of prices on a regular
basis

Non locational and technology coupling
adders

Able to reward systems in beneficial
locations and/or pairing with other
technologies

Uncertain economics due to future rate
changes

A 20-year contract at a fixed price makes
solar financing easier and does not leave
customers with unmet expectations if
anticipated cost increases do not
materialize.
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Figure 8. Representative Utility Bill with Value of Solar Credit
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Figure 9. Market Overview

5. Conclusion
This whitepaper proposes an alternative (not a replacement) to the existing net-metering program that
supports the installation of additional solar while prioritizing ratepayer benefits and encouraging
fairness, transparency, and market principles. Moreover, it proposes the opening of a new market
segment, wholesale DG, which can deliver nearly the same benefits of rooftop solar but with significant
discounts in cost. The policy vision presented here seeks to strike a balance between diverse
stakeholder interests with a unique focus on producing benefits for all of Maine’s ratepayers.
While many details will need to be defined, it is our hope that all parties can agree on the general goal
of maximizing benefits while mitigating costs, and that this common guiding principle can foster further
dialogue on strategic and sustainable solar deployment in Maine. Rather than simply adopt the policy
conventions of other states, Maine can establish a policy tailored to its specific needs, goals, and market
structure. Maine can build on the innovative, collaborative work in its Value of Solar Study to be the first
restructured market to adopt a value of solar based compensation structure. It can also be one of the
first states to aggregate DG resources to the benefit of all ratepayers. This approach also supports
building a sustainable solar industry while benefiting all ratepayers. Finally, Maine can both recognize
the value and benefits that distributed solar provides, while not necessarily paying for each and every
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value. Instead, ratepayers can and should obtain these values at the lowest price possible, while still
maintaining resource diversity and customer sited options. For this concept specifically, Maine can show
a path forward that balances cost-based resource acquisition with value-based compensation in a way
that is efficient, transparent, and fair.
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Appendix
Lessons learned: California
In 2007, California launched the California Solar Initiative (“CSI”) with the goal of installing 1,940
megawatts (MW) of solar in the three IOU service territories by the end of 2016 and transition the
industry to a point where it can thrive without state subsidies. As of the April, 2015 the program has
incentivized 1,893 MW of solar, nearly reaching its statutory goal 1.5 years ahead of schedule. The
program is ratepayer funded and incentivizes residential and non-residential system between 1 kW and
1,000 kW and is widely regarded as one of the most successful solar incentive programs in the world. It
has a unique structure that has allowed it to avoid the boom-bust cycles of other incentive programs
that have cooled off or disappeared after feed-in tariffs were retroactively rolled back, incentive
programs changed, or renewable energy credit markets collapsed. As the CSI program draws to a close,
the market is not cooling off – developers are installing projects in record numbers.
Much of the success of the CSI program can be attributed to its capacity-based declinations in incentive
levels. As installed capacity targets are reached, incentive levels drop down accordingly. Under this
approach, instead of relying on legislators or having funding allocated based on calendar year or some
other arbitrary time frame, the market dictates incentive levels. In addition, competition prevents
developers from artificially increasing their rates in order to capture a portion of the incentive –virtually
all of it gets passed through to the customer. 9
8F

The CSI pays solar customers through two types of incentives, (1) Expected Performance-Based
Buydown (“EPBB”) and (2) a Performance-Based Incentive (“PBI”). The EPBB is an upfront incentive
available only for systems <50 kW and is paid on a $/W basis. The PBI is applied to systems >50 kW and
pays customers based on actual measured performance of over 5 years. The incentive is paid on a fixed
dollar per kilowatt-hour ($/kWh) of generation.
Figure A-1 highlights how CSI incentives step down as capacity increases. Once the capacity for a given
step (shown in yellow) is reached, the program simply transitions to the next step and incentives shift
accordingly. With every sequential step, the capacity has a larger. Systems for government or non-profit
customers are on a separate track.

9

Dong, C.G.; Wiser, R.; Rai, V. 2014. Incentive Pass-through for Residential Solar Systems in California. Berkeley,
CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-6927e.pdf
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Figure A-1. The CSI Capacity-based Incentive Step Down

Lessons learned: Minnesota
In March, 2014, Minnesota became the first state in the nation to approve a Value of Solar tariff. The
legislation allowed the utilities to voluntarily implement the policy - in lieu of the existing net metering
program. Below are key characteristics of MN VOS policy 10, 11:
9F






10F

Size limitations: <1MW (and limited to 120% of the customer’s load)
Compensation decoupled from retail electricity price: The customer is billed for total electricity
usage at the retail rate. Their bill is credited at the VOS rate based on their solar system’s
production.
Value:

10

Minnesota Value of Solar: Methodology. Minnesota Department of Commerce, Division of Energy Resources.
April, 2014. http://mn.gov/commerce/energy/images/DRAFT-MN-VOS-Methodology-111913.pdf
11
Cory, Karlynn. Minnesota Values Solar Generation with New “Value of Solar” Tariff. October 3, 2014. NREL (blog).
https://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/blog/vos-series_minnesota
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o The VOS is expressed as the levelized value over 25 year, expressed in $/kWh.
o Reflects values to the utility, its customers, and to society.
o VOS rate is updated annually, using transparent inputs and calculations.
Tariff: Intended to reflect the displacement of existing values - it is not an incentive.

The VOS rate, established by the MN Department of Commerce, is currently higher than retail
electricity costs. Therefore, no MN utility has adopted the policy. However, as retail prices increase – or
as the VOS decreases - and ultimately eclipses the VOS rate, it is likely that the utilities will opt to apply
to the MN Public Utilities Commission to enact the VOS in the place of net metering. By establishing a
transparent market price, the VOS addresses concerns about having non-solar customers subsidizing
solar customers. It remains to be seen, however, whether the VOS is compatible with 3rd party business
models.

Lessons Learned: Arizona
In 2012 the Arizona Corporation Commission instated a quarterly trigger decline mechanism for
residential PV incentives. This was in response to boom and bust cycles of incentives that hurt the
industry and led to ratepayers over paying for incentives. Perhaps the most intricate of any state step
down, the exact amount of the incentive decline related to how soon a capacity target was reached. This
produced a gradual step down sensitive to panel prices and financial innovation.
Figure A-2. Rules for Arizona’s Quarterly Declination Mechanism
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Due to this structure, 2012 saw a record year for residential installs in Arizona compared to years past.
The rooftop solar industry was able to scale and ratepayers saved money. This set the stage for the
industry to move off of direct incentives the following year. NREL in a report on “value of solar tariffs
stated the following:
“It is only within the last two years that solar in portions of certain states (e.g., Hawaii,
California, and Arizona) has moved from pre-economic to grid-competitive, allowing for the
reduction or elimination of state and utility incentives while still maintaining high solar growth
rates. Utilities in those three states account for 65% of the national distributed solar market
capacity in MW (Makhyoun et al. 2014).” 12
1F

12

“Value of Solar: Program Design and Implementation Considerations” National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL) http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/62361.pdf
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